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11 Introduction
Among the many aspects of the performing arts that have either been or
could be modelled economically (for an overview see Blaug, 2001), we focus on
three “stylized facts” in this paper: First, in many countries, such as France,
Germany and the United Kingdom, the provision of the performing arts is
essentially assigned to the public sector. Second, publicly run performing
arts organizations (henceforth PAOs) usually have relatively low box–oﬃce
takings in relation to operating costs. Third, the rate of capacity utilization
is far below 100%, i.e., there is a large and persistent excess supply of seats.
For example, in the 2001/02 season, Germany’s municipalities provided 152
public playhouses, opera houses and musical theaters. Their average box–
oﬃce takings were only 12.9% of their total operating costs, corresponding
to a mean subsidy of 101.79e per ticket sold. Furthermore, Germany’s public
theaters could enter a utilization ratio of no more than 72% in the books.1
In order to explain these “stylized facts” we proceed as follows. After
discussing some basic principles (Section 2), we develop a formal model in the
style of Strotz’ (1965) road congestion model, in which the performing arts are
modelled as congestible public goods (Section 3). Having derived the demand
and cost functions, we estimate the model parameters using German data
for the 2001/02 season (Section 4). In a subsequent social choice analysis, we
introduce three possible types of directorship (welfare maximization, proﬁt
maximization, maximization of the welfare of a theater lobby) and test which
of them best describes the empirically observed equilibrium (Section 5). The
paper ends in Section 6 with some concluding remarks.
1Most of Germany’s 209 so–called private PAOs received large subsidies by their mu-
nicipal or state governments, too.
22 Basic Principles
How should the performing arts be modelled? First of all, an adequate out-
put measure is to be determined. While some authors used qualitative output
measures,2 we want to devote our model almost exclusively to the quantitati-
ve aspects of the performing arts. As noted by Throsby (1990), the perception
of quality certainly plays an important part in demand and supply decisi-
ons in the performing arts. However, leaving aside the subjectivity of quality
perception, almost all qualitative output measures lack a clear relation to
input and, thus, production costs. According to Throsby and Withers (1979)
the quantitative aspects of the performing arts are best measured in terms
of seats, number of performances and total seating capacity.
A theater or a opera house is the typical case of a congestible public
facility: For a given seating capacity, there is some degree of rivalry, which
manifests itself in queues in front of the ticket oﬃce or in the noise level of
a full house. Furthermore, consumers can easily be excluded at the ticket
oﬃce or at the front door of the theater. The eﬃciency conditions for the
provision of such goods were studied, for example, by Oakland (1972) and
Sandmo (1973). For instance, from transportation economics it is known that
the optimum toll for a congested road must equal the marginal congestion
externality in the social optimum and that marginal cost pricing will bring
in enough returns if capacity can be provided at constant returns to scale
(for an overview see, for example, Small, 1992; and Arnott and Kraus, 2003).
2Throsby and Withers (1979) compiled a catalogue of qualitative measures such as the
source material, the technical standard of a performance and its beneﬁts to the audience,
the society and the speciﬁc form of art. Throsby (1990) used press reviews to assess the
quality of three theater companies in Sydney. See also Globerman and Book (1977) and
Abbe–Decarroux (1994).
3In principle, due to their excludability, the performing arts could be provi-
ded privately. However, from an empirical point of view, ﬁxed costs speak on
behalf the public provision of the performing arts. Diminishing average costs
in the provision of seat capacity were documented, for example, by Baumol
and Bowen (1966) for US symphony orchestras, Globerman and Book (1972,
1977) for Canadian theaters and orchestras, Lange et al. (1985) and Lange
and Luksetich (1993) for Australian symphony orchestras, Gray (1992) for
Norwegian theaters, Hjorth–Andersen (1992) for Danish theaters and Krebs
(1996) for German theaters. In the following, we therefore assume that the
production of seat capacity is subject to large ﬁxed costs.
Many further reasons have been put forward to justify public provision.
Baumol and Bowen (1966) argued the performing arts would suﬀer from
the “cost disease”; but no empirical support was found for their hypothesis
(Blaug, 2001, p. 131). According to Musgrave (1957), the performing arts
have the character of a merit good which should be provided by the state on
paternalistic grounds. Penne and Shanahan (1987) showed that US cities used
arts investments as a tool to stimulate city development. Spatial externalities
or spillovers could require a money transfer to cities operating PAOs. In this
paper, we assume that the market for performance is deﬁned at the level
of municipalities. Other externalities than congestion will not be modelled.
However, we will come back to possible positive externalities when assessing
the eﬃciency of Germany’s performing arts sector in Section 5.5.
3 The Model
We consider a municipality with a continuum of n citizens, where each citizen
is characterized by a preference parameter ζ with continuous density function
4f(ζ) and distribution function F(ζ). ζ encompasses all aspects of attending
a play from which a member of the audience can beneﬁt. Individuals are
assumed to maximize the same quasi–linear utility function
u = x + v (z,Γ;ζ). (1)
As in Strotz (1965, p. 129), three arguments enter the utility function.
First, z is the number of visits to a theater. In order to simplify matters,
we focus on a single play and assume that attendance is a binary choice
variable, i.e., z ∈ {0,1}.3
Second, Γ is a measure of congestion, which is identical for all citizens.
Let us denote ticket demand (for a single play) by q and ticket supply or
capacity by s, where the latter quantity simply is the number of seats oﬀered





and henceforth call this ratio the loading of the theater. It is not too farfet-
ched to assume that the loading of the theater will aﬀect the experience of
the performance itself, i.e., Γ = Γ(L), with its ﬁrst derivative denoted by
Γ0. On the one hand, a relatively low loading may distract from the festive
ambience of the event.4 Nobody would like to sit in an empty theater. On
the other hand, a relatively high loading may involve negative side eﬀects.
Anybody who has tried to purchase tickets for a popular production knows
what we mean: After having waited in a long queue or having been placed in
3This excludes the possibility that a person repeatedly attends the same play. Fur-
thermore, we implicitly assume that inhabitants have perfect foresight as to the perceived
quality of the play and, therefore, will not leave the play part way through it. Note that
in Strotz (1965), z, more generally is deﬁned as a nonnegative real number, namely the
number of trips on a highway.
4We thank Richard Arnott for stressing this point.
5the waiting loop of a call center, one ﬁnds out that the most preferred dates
or places are not available any more. Once one has made it to the theater, it
is impossible to get a parking lot, the wardrobes are overcrowded and there is
no chance of getting a refreshment between two acts. Above all, background
noise interferes with artistic enjoyment.
The third argument in the utility function, x, x ∈ R+, is consumption of a
numeraire good. A tax τ, τ ∈ R, is deducted from (exogenous) gross income
y, y ∈ R+.5 Note that tax and gross income may diﬀer among citizens, but
they do not depend on ζ. p is the price of an admission ticket in terms of
the numeraire. Price diﬀerentiation with respect to tiers is not taken into
account. Hence, the budget constraint of an individual is given by
y − τ = x + p · z. (3)
Solving the utility maximization problem (1) with (3) as a constraint yields
the demand function z = z(·,ζ) and the indirect utility function
u = y − τ − p · z(ζ) + v [z(ζ),Γ(L);ζ]. (4)
5By assuming exogeneity of income, we neglect repercussions of PAOs on income. As
noted above, one could argue that a theater is a kind of public input for the tourism
industry and related branches, or that the performing arts raise the educational level and,
therefore, increase the earning capabilities of the population. Hence, the model is only
partial equilibrium. Likewise, separability of the utility function with respect to income
and attending a performance is admittedly unrealistic. Empirical studies have shown indi-
vidual preferences for the consumption of performance to depend positively on income and
several characteristics which are linked to income such as education and exposure to the
performing arts during childhood (see, e.g., Blaug 2001 and the references stated therein).
In fact, in the empirical part of the paper, we will control for income eﬀects. However,
in order to keep the model mathematically tractable, we stick to this assumption in the
theoretical parts of the paper.






0 for z = 0,
ζ − Γ(L) for z = 1.
(5)
If a person visits the theater, the disutility of congestion has to be set oﬀ
from the positive aspects of attending a performance. Obviously, a person is
indiﬀerent as to whether she will attend or forego a performance if u(z = 0) =
u(z = 1) or
ζ = p + Γ(L). (6)
In equation (6), ζ has an easy interpretation. It is the reservation price of at-
tending a performance, i.e., the maximum amount a person would be willing
to spend on an admission ticket, including congestion costs.
Since the reservation price is distributed with F(·), total ticket demand










This is a demand relation that cannot be solved for q without making assump-
tions about the shape of F(·). Yet, general statements about the impact of
changes of the capacity of the theater and the ticket price on ticket demand





















1 + nfΓ0 1
s
. (9)
According to (8), a price increase unambiguously reduces ticket demand. A
positive Γ0, i.e., a relatively high loading, attenuates the negative eﬀect of
7the price increase since the decrease in the loading positively aﬀects ticket
demand. Otherwise, if the loading is relatively low (Γ0 < 0), the eﬀect of
a price increase is magniﬁed. Furthermore, the larger the capacity of the
theater, the less pronounced is the congestion eﬀect. Equation (9) shows that
a capacity increase either stimulates or weakens ticket demand, depending
on the sign of Γ0.
On the supply side, we assume the PAOs’ cost function to be given by
C = Cf + αs, (10)
where Cf are the ﬁxed costs and α the marginal provision costs. Costs include
maintaining the theater and producing the staging. In this respect, our model
diﬀers from the road congestion model. Strotz’ (1965) considers pleasure
trips, i.e., the road converts, say, a nice landscape into utility, where the
landscape is obviously not being “produced” as a staging.
4 Empirical Test
4.1 Empirical Model Speciﬁcation













where F −1 is the inverse of the distribution function of ζ. In order to make
the model empirically testable, we assume that preferences are uniformly
distributed over the interval [0, ¯ ζ], where ¯ ζ is the maximum willingness–to–
pay (WTP) for an admission ticket.6 With uniform preferences, we have
6We also did robustness checks with exponential and logistic preferences. Since this led
to qualitatively and quantitatively similar results, we omit the respective calculations and
8F −1 = ¯ ζ · (1 − q/n). The term (1 − q/n) is simply the share of non–visitors
in the total population of the municipality. Mean and Variance of the WTP
are given by ¯ ζ/2 and ¯ ζ2/12, respectively.
As the demand for theatrical performance has been shown to depend on
income by several authors, we control for income eﬀects by making the para-
meter for the maximum WTP depend on income, i.e., adding the respective
interaction terms between income Y and demand: F −1 = ¯ ζ0 ·(1 − q/n)+ ¯ ζ1 ·
Y ·(1−q/n). Likewise, other demographic variables that could possibly aﬀect
ticket demand can be integrated into the empirical model.
Finally, the congestion function has to be parameterized. A congestion
function that has become standard in transportation economics7 is given by
Γ(L) = γ0 + γ1L
γ2, (12)
where γ1,γ2 > 0. Hence, the disutility of congestion is a monotonously incre-
asing function of the loading. In our model, however, this speciﬁcation has
to be replaced by a functional form allowing for a critical loading L0 which
















The congestion function (13) can be convex (γ2 > 1), linear (γ2 = 1), or
concave (0 < γ2 < 1).8 If γ0 > 0, then there are—even if the actual loading
is optimal with respect to the critical value—additional subjective costs of
results here. These are reported, however, in an extended working paper version of this
article (Traub and Missong, 2003).
7See Arnott and Kraus (2003). Alternative functional forms, such as the piecewise linear
congestion function, are discussed, for example, in Small (1992).
8Note that we assume here that the disutility of congestion is symmetric around the
critical loading. In the empirical analysis, we also experimented with non–symmetric spe-
ciﬁcations. However, we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant indications for non–symmetry.
9attending a performance that are not covered by the ticket price. As noted
above, these costs comprise the disutility of congestion (i.e. queueing and
noise) and a reduction of the festive nature of the performance caused by
empty seats. If the actual loading is higher than the critical value, congestion
costs increase faster than the latter decrease and vice versa.
4.2 The Data
We used two data sources, the Theaterstatistik, an annual publication of the
German association of public PAOs (Deutscher Buehnenverein, 2001/2002),
and the statistical yearbook of German municipalities, which is edited by
the Deutscher Staedtetag (2000). Except for data taken from the statistical
yearbook, all data refer to the 2001/02 season. Inter alia, the Theatersta-
tistik lists all German public PAOs with their location (municipality), the
number of inhabitants of the municipality (as of January 2002), the number
and names of stages, and—for every stage—the number of seats oﬀered to
the audience (per performance), the number and types (opera, ballet, play,
etc.) of performances, including guest performances of external companies.
Furthermore, for every stage, the Theaterstatistik shows the total number
of visitors (including external guest performances). At the PAO–level, the
statistic accounts for operating revenues and expenses, split up into several
subcategories.
Table 1 lists the most important data for Germany’s public theater sector.
In the 2001/02 season, there were 115 locations with at least one PAO.9 The
total seating capacity in the 2001/2002 season reached some 27 million. Given
that only about 20 million tickets were sold, the average loading was 72%.
9Since 7 PAOs were jointly operated by two municipalities, the actual number of mu-
nicipalities involved in the provision of the performing arts was 122.
10Note that these ﬁgures include only tickets sold at the location of the PAO
including guest performances of external companies on one of the PAO’s
stages, while guest performances of one of the PAO’s companies at other
municipalities had to be omitted since no information about the respective
seating capacities, population etc. is available.
Operating revenues were computed as the sum of ticket revenues, war-
drobe fees, and program fees. Other sources of revenue such as from TV and
radio broadcasts were not taken into account. Operating expenses consist
of personnel costs and material costs such as equipment and copyright dues
less the costs of guest plays in other municipalities (which do not enter ticket
revenues either). As can be taken from Table 1, an average PAO suﬀered a
loss of about 100e per ticket sold, which had to be set oﬀ by subsidies.
Table 2 lists the variables used in the empirical analysis and their means.
The prevailing price of a ticket on a location was computed as the ratio
of the 2001/02 season’s operating revenues and the number of visitors. The
table shows that the average ticket price p was 10.98e. As in the theoretical
model, q is the number of tickets sold per staging and s is the seating capacity
per staging, i.e., the number of visitors and the capacity on a location were
divided by the number of stagings within the season. The loading L is deﬁned
by equation (2). The mean of the population, n is a bit higher than in Table
1, since three relatively small cities dropped out of the sample.10
In contrast to demand, where we considered the municipal level (112
locations), in estimating the cost function we focussed on the PAO level since
aggregating over diﬀerent PAOs would not produce sensible estimates for the
ﬁxed costs Cf and the marginal cost parameter α. We computed average costs
10The three excluded cities are Dinslaken (no box–oﬃce returns), Eggenfelden and
Landshut (irresolvable data inconsistencies with respect to loading and price).
11per staging of some 600,000e. Note that we included all 152 PAOs as there
were no inconsistencies or noticeable problems with the cost–data.
While the basic model as outlined in Section 3 comprises variables p to
C, in some of the regressions, we also included an income variable Y in
order to control for income eﬀects. Since neither the Theaterstatistik nor
the statistical yearbook contain data on incomes at the municipal level, we
constructed an index from the per capita income tax returns that are shown
for every municipality in the statistical yearbook. Y is the yearly per capita
income tax returns, centered and normalized by its mean (Y = (y−µy)/µy).
In a theater landscape like Germany’s there are obvious diﬀerences in
quality. In the theoretical part of the paper, we could neglect those diﬀe-
rences as we derived seat demand and capacity supply for a hypothetical
“average” staging. In contrast to this, it is to be expected that empirical
prices and quantities reﬂect a large variance of quality. We therefore attempt
to control for quality eﬀects by using a suitable proxy variable. The variable
we chose is population size and reﬂects the authors’ opinion that, on average,
metropolitan theaters provide qualitatively better performances than provin-
cial theaters. Like income, population size n entered some of the regressions
centered and normalized by its mean.
Furthermore, the following dummies and control variables were included
in the demand regressions.
- East: there may be diﬀerences in demand behavior between East and
West German municipalities, i.e., less WTP in East Germany.
- Uni: the existence of a university on location should lead to higher
demand, since the educational level of the population is higher.
- Age: econometric demand studies show that young parents cannot af-
12ford time and money to regularly attend theatrical performances. Since
no information on the age distribution at the municipal level was availa-
ble, we chose the ratio of places in old people’s homes and kindergarden
places, centered and normalized by the mean, as a proxy. Both ﬁgures
are listed in the statistical yearbook.
- Share: not only income but also the tax rate enters the budget cons-
traint (3). Share is the proportion of subsidies, necessary to make up
for the losses of the PAO(s), which a municipality has to shoulder itself.
Data source is the Theaterstatistik. An increase in share decreases net
income and should therefore reduce demand.
4.3 Estimation and Results








− γ0 − γ1 (|Lj − L0|)
γ2 + ε2 (14)
j = 1,...,112
Ck = Cf + αsk + ε2 (15)
k = 1,...,152,
where F −1 has to be replaced by the inverse of the uniform distribution func-
tion and may also include interaction terms with income and other variables.
First, we estimated both equations separately. As the congestion function is
nonlinear in its parameters, we used nonlinear least squares (NLSQ) in order
to estimate the demand function. Applying NLSQ to our data set led to se-
rious convergence problems, and the results turned out to be very sensitive
to the choice of starting values. Hence, we decided to linearize the model and
to combine estimation with a grid search algorithm for the best ﬁtting value
of the critical loading L0.
13Linearization means that we ﬁxed the parameter value of γ2 at 2, 1, and
0.5, respectively, which gives the congestion function a u–shape (increasing
marginal disutility), a v–shape (constant marginal disutility), or a conca-
ve shape (decreasing marginal disutility). Concerning L0, we used a grid
search on the closed interval [0,1] with a grid size of 0.01. Below, only re-
sults shown are those which gave the best ﬁt in terms of maximizing the
likelihood function. Throughout estimation, the Breusch–Pagan statistic in-
dicated heteroscedasticity of the residuals. As we were not able to correct for
this using transformations of the estimation equation, we account for hete-
roscedasticity by calculating White’s heteroscedasticity consistent estimator
of the covariance matrix.
Table 3 contains the results of estimating the demand equation with uni-
form preferences, Tables 4 and 5 for exponential and logistic preferences,
respectively. Model I is the basic model as outlined in Section 3 of the pa-
per. Model II additionally accounts for income as an explanatory variable.
In the third model, all variables described above entered the regression at
some step of the analysis. At the head of the table, the speciﬁcation of γ2
is stated. For models II and III, we only list the results for decreasing and
constant marginal disutility, because the u–shaped congestion function al-
ways gave the worst ﬁt. The bottom of the tables contain log–likelihood, F
statistic, adjusted coeﬃcient of determination, and Breusch–Pagan’s test for
heteroscedasticity.
We only comment on the linear model with γ2 = 1. According to our
Model I, the maximum WTP for a ticket is about 32e and the mean WTP
is close to 16e. As to the congestion function, we record an intercept of
18e and marginal congestion costs of 12e. For the critical loading, we get
sensible ﬁgures. A ˆ L0 of 0.85 means that spectators feel most comfortable
14with the external circumstance of visiting a performance if about 85 percent
of all seats are taken.
Adding income to the regression (Model II) shows that the maximum
WTP depends positively on the income level of the municipality, where an
average city exhibits a ˆ ¯ ζ of 25e only.11 Adding income also pushes back the
negative inﬂuence of congestion on ticket demand. In this regression, ˆ γ0 is
insigniﬁcant; ˆ γ1 is only 8e, though still signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This
result may be driven by a slight multi–collinearity problem as, particularly
in East Germany, there is a high positive correlation between income and
loading.
Model III includes all variables listed in Table 2 except for age and the
dummy for East Germany. Age was not signiﬁcant in any of the regressions
and was therefore excluded from further consideration. Using the East dum-
my together with income involved a huge multi–collinearity problem, since
there were only three West German municipalities with comparably low in-
come. As can be taken from Table 3, ticket demand shrunk signiﬁcantly if
the citizen of the municipality had to bear a higher share of subsidies. Note
that a higher need for subsidies could also reﬂect lower performance quality.
In university towns, the WTP for tickets was generally higher. Population
size had a positive eﬀect on ticket demand. As argued above, population may
be seen as a very crude proxy for quality. Hence, quality had, as expected,
a positive impact on the citizens’ WTP. Again, however, there is a positive
11In the table, we denote this inﬂuence by the interaction “Income × Maximum WTP”
in order to highlight that the respective coeﬃcient is part of the maximum WTP, i.e.,
¯ ζ = ¯ ζ0+ ¯ ζ1Y , while the “true” interaction is, of course, between demographic variable and
demand term, i.e., Y × (1 − q/n). The same remark applies to Model III for the other
demographic variables. Note also that we implicitly assume that income and the other
demographic variables have a linear impact on the maximum (mean) WTP.
15mutual correlation between the four variables income, population, university,
and loading, which may help to explain the low and insigniﬁcant values we
obtained for the congestion parameters.
As regards to the costs function, our estimates for the ﬁxed costs and
the marginal provision costs are given by about 290,000e per staging and
35e per seat (see Table 6), respectively. In columns 2 and 3 of the table, we
have listed the same estimates for PAOs with and without competitors at
their location. At 14% of all locations more than one PAO was active. Our
results suggest that municipalities with multiple PAOs exerted pressure on
the marginal costs, while ﬁxed costs were lower if there was no competitor.
We also report separate estimates for pure opera houses and theaters in the
last two columns of the table.12 Opera houses were operating with huge ﬁxed
costs, about 900,000e, and small variable costs as compared to theaters,
which exhibited ﬁxed costs per staging of not much more than 75,000e.
To summarize this section, our empirical estimations of the demand func-
tion and the cost function generally conﬁrm our theoretical model. The cen-
tral parameters of the model are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and exhibit
the right sign. We attribute the deterioration of the estimates for the con-
gestion function in the models with income and other control variables to
multi–collinearity among these variables. Note that we also estimated the
empirical model with generalized least squares (GLS) as a system of seemin-
gly unrelated regression equations (SURE). Since the results did not change
qualitatively as compared to the single equation regressions and the SURE
model did not improve on the eﬃciency of the parameter estimates, we omit
the respective tables.13
12The remaining 68 PAOs provide a mixed program.
13Some of the locations have more than just one PAO. In the SURE model, these location
gain a greater weight in the demand equation, proportional to the number of PAOs. This
165 Social Choice Analysis
5.1 Preliminaries
We begin this section with some assumptions and deﬁnitions. In Subsections
2 to 4, we theoretically analyze three diﬀerent potential types of directorship,
to wit, welfare maximization, proﬁt maximization and maximization only of
the welfare of the theater lobby. Subsequently, we derive for each type of
directorship the conditions to be a social choice equilibrium. Completing the
section, we use the empirical estimates from the previous section to test which
of these equilibria best describes the current situation of the performing arts
in Germany.
Since the general theoretical model outlined in Section 3 cannot be solved
algebraically, we proceed on the following simplifying assumptions:
- Preferences are uniformly distributed over the closed interval [0, ¯ ζ].
- The congestion function14 is linear and we do not consider the case
of a loading of the facility too low, i.e., we restrict our attention to
q/s ≥ L0, which then yields






Obviously, if the loading was too low, a proﬁt or welfare maximizing
director would reduce the number of seats, thereby simultaneously sa-
ving costs and decreasing the disutility of under–utilization, at least
until the lower bound L = L0 is reached.
is in contrast to the single equation analysis, where all locations are treated equally.
14Note that the assumption that Γ is identical for all citizens guarantees that the mo-
nopoly price exceeds the welfare maximizing price. With heterogeneous congestion costs,
the order of prices could be reversed if marginal consumers are suﬃciently more averse to
congestion than inframarginal consumers (see Edelson, 1971; and Mills, 1981).
17- All citizens dispose of the same income which is normalized to zero.





i.e., gains and losses of operating the PAO are shared equally by all
citizens including those who do not attend performances. Hence, the
subsidies that are necessary to make up for the losses of the PAO are
taken from general tax money. In the same manner, gains fully beneﬁt
the citizens of the municipality. Note that this assumption implies that
there are no welfare leakages.
Given these assumptions, the utility of an inhabitant is given by
u =





















Accordingly, inverse ticket demand is given by












We anticipate subsequent results and note that the optimum loading L?
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1 for α ≥ γ1
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As regards to public facilities oﬀering output in terms of discrete indivisible
units such as seats, a loading in excess of one is unrealistic. Hence, if mar-
ginal provision costs are larger than marginal congestion costs, the optimum
18loading is reached at unity. If congestion is more important than provision,
then the optimum loading is determined by the ratio of marginal provision
and congestion costs. Since the case L < L0 has been ruled out by us for
logical reasons, for values of α smaller than γ1L 2
0 , any type of director will





?, r = {W,M,C}, (21)
where W, M, and C stand for welfare maximization, proﬁt maximization
and maximization of the welfare of the theater lobby, respectively.
Furthermore, in order to abbreviate mathematical expressions, we deﬁne
ξ and θ as follows:
ξ =

   
   
α for L? = 1
√
αγ1 for 1 > L? > L0
γ1L0 for L? = L0
(22)
and
θ = γ0 + γ1(L
? − L0). (23)
The former expression, ξ, is the social marginal cost of an additional spec-
tator (i.e. ∂C/∂q). In the intermediate case, it is just the geometric mean
of marginal provision and congestion costs. In the two special cases, only
marginal provision costs or marginal congestion costs become relevant for
society. The latter expression, θ, is the congestion costs experienced by an
attendant. It is a constant part in the utility function: by deﬁnition q/s = L
and we know from above that L? is a ﬁxed term determined only by the two
diﬀerent types of private marginal costs. Hence, we arrive at (23) by plugging
(20) into the term in brackets in the utility function (18).
195.2 Welfare Maximization
In the case of welfare maximization, the director of the PAO acts as a social




= argmaxp,s W, where every citizen
is given the same weight. The municipality’s welfare can be obtained by
integrating (18) over ζ which yields
W = pq − Cf − αs + n ·






The ﬁrst part of the expression is the PAO’s losses, while the second part is
consumer surplus.
After deriving the welfare function (24) and solving the ﬁrst order condi-
tions for p and s, we obtain the welfare maximizing price
p
W = ξ (25)
and capacity
s
W = n ·





This result does not harbor any surprises: the eﬃcient ticket price covers
the social marginal costs. The optimum seating capacity is just the expected
number of attendants adjusted for the optimum loading.




(¯ ζ − θ − ξ)2
. (27)
Only cities exhibiting a population of size nW or larger can operate a PAO
without welfare losses. Otherwise, consumer surplus would not suﬃce to cover
the ﬁxed costs.15
15Provision thresholds have been studied, for example, by Schmandt and Stephens
(1960), and may be regarded as an explanation of the high degree of congestion of local
public goods found in empirical studies. On the so–called “zoo eﬀect” see Oates (1988).
205.3 Proﬁt Maximization
Next, we consider the laissez–faire equilibrium. With diminishing average
costs in the long run only a single theater will survive at each municipality.
Hence, its director behaves as a monopolist, and she will choose price and





Π = pq − Cf − αs. (28)
Solving the maximization problem, the monopolist’s proﬁt maximizing
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Comparing (25) with (29) shows that the monopoly price is larger than
the welfare maximizing price if the maximum WTP for a ticket exceeds the
social marginal costs of a ticket plus the individual congestion costs, i.e.,
if there is demand for tickets under welfare maximizing directorship. The




(¯ ζ − θ − ξ)2
(31)
holds. Accordingly, private provision of the performing arts requires twice
the population as compared to (welfare maximizing) public provision.
5.4 Lobby Welfare Maximization
The theater lobby is composed of the citizens who attend performances.
Under the inﬂuence of the theater lobby, the director chooses p and s to
21maximize the welfare of the spectators only,

pW,sW	
= argmaxp,s W C. It
is assumed that the director draws on the non–members, too, for ﬁnancing
the PAO.16 As many public facilities are partly ﬁnanced by the community
as a whole but frequented only by an interest group which additionally pays
user charges or membership fees (for example, swimming pools, libraries, and
gymnasiums), we believe that we can make a good case for this assumption.
The theater lobby’s welfare is given by
W
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Equation (32) cannot be solved algebraically for n in order to compute
the provision threshold for the lobby in general. However, as an attendant
will be interested in a lobby “membership” only if uC(z = 1) > uW(z = 1),




(¯ ζ − θ − ξ)(θ + ξ)
(35)
holds. For a population of nC or larger, the lobby ticket price is smaller and
the lobby seating capacity is greater than the welfare maximizing. Further-
more, it is easy to show that nC is greater than (equal to, smaller than) nW
16In this respect the PAO diﬀers from what is usually considered as a club in local public
ﬁnance (Buchanan, 1965). See also Reiter and Weichenrieder (1999).
22if ¯ ζ is greater than (equal to, smaller than) 3 × (θ + ξ). In the latter case,
nC < nW, where the maximum WTP for attending a performance is rela-
tively low, the lobby would operate the PAO even though it should be shut
down completely due to welfare losses. For the remainder of this section, we
assume that condition (35) is fulﬁlled.
5.5 Equilibrium
Let us assume that, in an original state where the citizens of the municipality
neither know their own preferences nor the distribution of preferences, they
have to decide on the provision mode of the performing arts. Which type of
directorship will emerge?
Result 1 (Proﬁt Maximization) If citizens are pessimistic, i.e., they be-
lieve that they will not be interested in the performing arts, the social con-
sensus will be the provision of the performing arts by private monopolists.
The argument is based on Rawls (1971) diﬀerence principle. If people have to
decide from under a veil of ignorance, by lack of distributional information,
they choose the mode of provision where the worst outcome in that mode of
provision is better than the worst outcome in any alternative mode. Hence,
the worst case (to be assumed) would be no interest in theaters at all.
Under welfare maximizing directorship, the indirect utility of a person
not attending a staging is given by her share of ﬁxed costs of that staging
u




while monopolistic directorship additionally gives her a share in the PAO’s
proﬁts
u






(¯ ζ − θ − ξ)2
¯ ζ
. (37)
23Under the lobby solution, the utility of a non–attendant is given by
u
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q






which is smaller than (36) by condition (35). Hence, we have uM(z = 0) >
uW(z = 0) > uC(z = 0) which closes the argument.
Result 2 (Welfare Maximization) If citizens are uncertain whether they
will be interested in the performing arts, then the social consensus will be
the public provision of the performing arts by a welfare maximizing social
planner.
The argument is based on Bernoulli’s and Laplace’s principle of insuﬃcient
reason (see Luce and Raiﬀa, 1957): there is a continuum of mutually exclusive
events ζ, the possibilities of which are unknown. Hence, the citizens assume
that all ζ’s are equally likely, and they base their decision on the provision
mode on the expected utility of the alternatives at hand.
Due to the linear structure of preferences, computation of a citizen’s ex-
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q
(3ζ − 2θ − 2ξ)2 − 12
¯ ζ
nCf)(3¯ ζ − 4θ − 4ξ)
¯ ζ
24Obviously, we have EUW > EUM. Furthermore, EUW > EUC if condition
(35) holds, which closes the argument.
Result 3 (Lobby Welfare Maximization) If citizens are optimistic, i.e.,
they believe that they will be interested in the performing arts, then the per-
forming arts will be provided publicly by a director who maximizes the welfare
of theater lobby only.
This result is based on the assumption that citizens follow a maximax strat-
egy, i.e., they opt for that mode of provision where the best outcome in that
mode of provision is better than the best outcome in any alternative mode.
Hence, they are extremely optimistic to attend performances. Setting ζ = ¯ ζ,
the utility of a citizen is given by
u
W(z = 1) = −
Cf
n
+ ¯ ζ − θ − ξ, (42)
u






(¯ ζ − θ − ξ), (43)
or
u
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respectively. Obviously, we have uW(z = 1) > uM(z = 1). uC(z = 1) >
uW(z = 1) follows from condition (35), which closes the argument.
5.6 Empirical Assessment
In the previous subsection, we have shown that the more likely the citizens
presume that they will beneﬁt from the performing arts, the higher the pro-
bability that the performing arts are publicly provided under the inﬂuence of
a selﬁsh theater lobby. Here, we test which of the three social choice equilibria
25best describes the German performing arts sector. In line with the linearized
theoretical model, we resort to the empirical Model I with uniform prefe-
rences and γ2 = 1. Hence, the following parameter values enter the analysis:
the maximum WTP is ˆ ¯ ζ = 31.68, the parameters of the congestion function
are ˆ γ0 = 17.66 and ˆ γ1 = 12.19, the critical loading is ˆ L0 = 0.85, and the
marginal and ﬁxed costs are ˆ α = 35.25 and ˆ Cf = 288,465, respectively (see
Tables 3 and 4). Since the marginal provision cost exceed the marginal con-
gestion costs, we have to set ˆ L? = 1, otherwise every seat would have to be
occupied 1.7 times. Accordingly, we get ˆ θ = 19.49 for the congestion costs
experienced by a spectator and ˆ ξ = 35.25 for the social marginal costs of an
additional spectator.
The ﬁrst puzzling observation to be highlighted here, is that the actual
average loading of Germany’s PAOs was only 0.7162 (std. error 0.0090) while
the optimum loading had been L? = 1. A one–tailed t test rejects the null
hypothesis of the mean to be one (n = 112, t = 31.533, p < .01). Since the
marginal congestion costs were distinctly smaller than the average provision
costs, any type of director would have been better oﬀ with decreasing the
capacity of the PAO. Though the model predicts that a loading below unity
can be optimal if congestion is just important enough, the model cannot
explain this empirical observation. Hence, there must be other reasons for
the average loading of German PAOs being so low. A possible explanation
might be that the capacity of the facility is not as variable as assumed in the
model.17
A further important observation is that the maximum WTP for a ticket
17Capacity adjustment may not only be restricted by ediﬁcial and technical reasons but
also by labor law. The “Normalvertrag Buehne”, the collective labor agreement between
all German actors and PAOs also contains very detailed working time regulations that
may prevent PAOs from reducing the number of performances of the same staging.
26is very small as compared to attendance costs, i.e., the condition ¯ ζ −θ−ξ >
0 is not fulﬁlled. Unfortunately, this aggravates further computations. In
particular, we cannot compute ˆ pM, ˆ sM, ˆ sW, ˆ pC and ˆ sC in order to perform
the test which of the three social choice equilibria best describes the current
situation in the German performing arts sector. We are able, however, to
compute the welfare maximizing ticket price, which according to equation
(25) must equal the social marginal cost: ˆ pW = 35.25e (std. error: 5.18).
Given the actual average ticket price of pact = 10.98e (std. error: 0.43), a
one–tailed t test clearly rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the two
means (n = 112, t = 4.669, p < .01). Hence, since (i) actual ticket prices are
signiﬁcantly smaller than the welfare maximizing ones, (ii) citizens on average
have to subsidize each seat with about 100e (see Table 1), and (iii) our
theoretical model suggests that lobby ticket prices are smaller than the social
marginal costs, it seems plausible to assume that Germany’s performing arts
sector is best described by a directorship that maximizes the utility of the
members of the theater lobby only.
According to Result 3, such a directorship emerges if people have a ve-
ry positive ex ante notion of the performing arts. In most countries where
the provision of the performing arts is a public task, this is clearly the case.
Advocates of public provision of the performing arts put forward the multi-
ple beneﬁts, merits, and positive externalities that are usually attributed to
the performing arts in order to justify the huge amount of subsidies ﬂowing
into the sector. From our study, we obtain a crude estimate of the lower
bound of the size of the externality necessary to justify public provision at
all:18 The ticket price that would be necessary to just cover both individual
18Alternatively, one could integrate an “externality parameter” into the model and try
to estimate it. We shy at doing so, as we would hardly be able to quantify the size of the
externality due to the lack of suitable data. A possible back door could be a cross country
27congestion and social marginal costs is in total 54.74e while the estimated
maximum WTP is only 31.68e. As the provision threshold of welfare ma-
ximizing directorship (i.e., eﬃcient provision) is given by (27) there must
be additional beneﬁts for the society of 23.06e due to the person with the
highest preference for theater attending a staging.
6 Conclusion
In many countries the provision of the performing arts is essentially assi-
gned to the public sector. Due to their low box–oﬃce takings in relation to
production costs, publicly run PAOs are usually highly subsidized by their
municipalities. Furthermore, there is a large and persistent excess supply of
seats. In order to explain these “stylized facts”, we developed a model in
the style of Strotz’ (1965) road congestion model, in which the performing
arts are modelled as congestible public goods. In accordance with empirical
evidence, the production of seat capacity is assumed to be subject to ﬁxed
costs. We estimated the parameters of the model’s demand and cost functi-
ons using German data. Using these estimates in a social choice analysis, we
showed that the current situation in the German performing arts sector is
best described by a directorship that under the inﬂuence of a selﬁsh theater
lobby maximizes the welfare of the spectators only. This equilibrium, charac-
terized by too low ticket prices and too large capacity, is likely to establish
if citizens have a very positive ex ante notion of the performing arts.
This—rather negative—result for Germany’s performing arts sector should
not be overrated. The analysis hinges on a number of simplifying assumpti-
study that should establish a positive relationship between the output of the performing
arts sector on the one hand and certain economic and non–economic variables, such as the
proﬁts of the tourism sector and education level, on the other hand.
28ons. Furthermore, we do not take into account any of the positive externali-
ties that are usually put forward to justify public ﬁnancing of the performing
arts. But it should also be noted that these externalities have, to our know-
ledge, never been quantiﬁed empirically and that it is hardly possible to do
so (though there are attempts; see Penne and Shanahan 1987).
The paper does not intend to challenge the public provision of the perfor-
ming arts in general; rather we would like to pinpoint some of the problems
that are involved with public operation of a congestible facility. An obvious
way to improve the economic performance of the sector is to bring down the
costs and to reduce the operating losses of the PAOs. Our empirical results
suggest that total seating capacity should be reduced by about one third. By
decreasing the number of seats oﬀered to the optimum level, ceteris paribus,
the performing arts sector as a whole could save 267e million (13.67e per
visitor). In turn, this would cause current attendants a utility loss of not
more than 4.8e million (0.25e per visitor) due to higher congestion.
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32Table 1 The German Theater Sector in the 2001/02 Season
Sum Mina Maxa Meana
Locations 115 — — —
Population 25,894,295 11,606 3,388,434 225,168
PAOsb 152 1 9 1.32
Stages 721 1 34 6.27
Stagings 4,415 5 213 38
Performances 62,574 60 3,782 544
Seats 269,537 171 18,903 2,343
Capacity 26,977,804 6,633 2,657,617 234,590
Visitors 19,534,076 2,724 1,853,070 169,861
Loadingc — 0.47 0.94 0.72
Op. revenuesc mill.e 298.581 0.040 46.505 2.666
Op. expensesc mill.e 2,319.854 0.574 237.788 20.713
Op. lossesc mill.e 2,021.273 0.333 191.283 18.047
–”– per ticketc e — 7.99 327.32 101.79
–”– per seatc e — 6.31 222.59 71.83
–”– per inhabitantc e — 5.38 628.28 99.21
Table notes. aRefers to locations. bOpernhaus Duesseldorf, Deut-
sche Oper am Rhein are pooled. cw/o Dinslaken, Eggenfelden,
Landshut.
33Table 2 Description and Means of Variables Entering the Regressions
Variable Description Mean
p price average ticket price on a location 10.98e
q demand average number of tickets sold per staging 4,309
s capacity average seating capacity per staging 6,027
L loading q/s 0.72
n population number of inhabitants 229,920
C costs average operating expenses per staging 607,065e
y income yearly per capita income tax returns 489.50e
east dummy for East Germany 0.31
uni dummy for university 0.54
age age proﬁle: places in old people’s homes over
kindergarten places
0.28
share relative share of subsidies borne by munici-
pality itself
0.53
34Table 3 Estimation of the Demand Function Using OLS with White’s Heteroscedasticity
Correction — Uniform Preferences
Model I Model II Model III
γ2 0.50 1.00 2.00 0.50 1.00 0.5 1.0
Maximum WTP 31.96*** 31.68*** 31.60*** 25.69*** 24.96*** 10.32* 9.64*
(9.63) (9.45) (9.22) (8.39) (8.02) (5.23) (5.19)
Income × — — — 3.86*** 3.89*** 2.45*** 2.50***
Maximum WTP (1.06) (1.08) (0.85) (0.87)
Share × — — — — — −1.90** −1.98**
Maximum WTP (0.96) (0.99)
Population × — — — — — 1.44*** 1.45***
Maximum WTP (0.33) (0.34)
Uni × — — — — — 2.17*** 2.22***
Maximum WTP (0.65) (0.66)
Mean WTP [15.98] [15.84] [15.80] [12.85] [12.48] [5.24] [4.90]
Variance WTP [85.14] [83.64] [83.21] [55.00] [51.92] [9.15] [7.99]
γ0 16.39* 17.66** 18.25** 11.25 11.82 2.46 2.20
(8.82) (8.77) (8.61) (8.82) (7.35) (4.43) (4.44)
γ1 9.25*** 12.19*** 24.26** 6.59* 7.59* 4.36* 4.50
(3.44) (4.60) (9.85) (3.44) (4.66) (2.48) (3.39)
L0 0.85 0.85 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
log–likelihood −318.23 −319.23 −320.12 −310.54 −311.47 −279.76 −280.66
F 11.22*** 10.05*** 9.03*** 13.80*** 12.98*** 24.45*** 23.78***
¯ R2 0.156 0.140 0.126 0.275 0.265 0.559 0.552
Breusch–Pagan χ2 10.23*** 10.41*** 9.92*** 11.37*** 11.18*** 25.29*** 26.05***
Table notes. Endogenous variable: average ticket price (p) in Euros. N = 112. *p ≤ .10,
**p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01. Standard errors in parentheses. Imputed parameters in brackets.
35Table 4 Estimation of the Demand Function Using OLS with White’s Heteroscedasticity
Correction — Exponential Preferences
Model I Model II Model III
γ2 0.50 1.00 2.00 0.50 1.00 0.5 1.0
Mean WTP 2.42*** 2.39*** 2.40*** 2.01*** 2.02*** 0.83 0.80
(0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.48) (0.48) (0.59) (0.60)
Income × — — — 1.00*** 1.02*** 0.75*** 0.77***
Mean WTP (0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.24)
Share × — — — — — −0.51* −0.53*
Mean WTP (0.31) (0.32)
Population × — — — — — 0.20*** 0.20***
Mean WTP (0.05) (0.05)
Uni × — — — — — 0.65*** 0.67***
Mean WTP (0.19) (0.19)
Variance WTP [5.86] [5.71] [5.76] [4.05] [4.05] [0.83] [0.79]
γ0 −5.56*** −4.14** −3.80** −5.84*** −4.78*** −8.95*** −8.18***
(1.68) (1.62) (1.65) (1.52) (1.43) (1.47) (1.41)
γ1 8.92*** 11.52*** 15.70** 6.14* 7.38* 4.18* 4.27
(3.10) (4.29) (6.52) (31.6) (4.42) (2.51) (3.46)
L0 0.86 0.86 1.00 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
log–likelihood −310.63 −311.61 −312.55 −301.49 −302.34 −281.66 −282.49
F 20.77*** 19.47*** 18.24*** 22.53*** 21.65*** 23.04*** 22.45***
¯ R2 0.263 0.250 0.237 0.368 0.358 0.544 0.537
Breusch–Pagan χ2 33.78*** 33.57*** 32.302*** 28.99*** 27.99*** 28.14*** 28.02***
Table note. Endogenous variable: average ticket price (p) in Euros. N = 112. *p ≤ .10,
**p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01. Standard errors in parentheses. Imputed parameters in brackets.
36Table 5 Estimation of the Demand Function Using OLS with White’s Heteroscedasticity
Correction — Logistic Preferences
Model I Model II Model III
γ2 0.50 1.00 2.00 0.50 1.00 0.5 1.0
(a0 − γ0) 6.14*** 4.70*** 4.37*** 6.62*** 5.42*** 11.03*** 10.28***
(1.59) (1.51) (1.53) (1.51) (1.40) (1.31) (1.22)
Income — — — 3.26*** 3.29*** 2.42*** 2.45***
(0.91) (0.94) (0.81) (0.83)
Share — — — — — −1.88* −1.94*
(0.99) (1.02)
Population — — — — — 1.39*** 1.41***
(0.36) (0.37)
Uni — — — — — 2.14*** 2.19***
(0.63) (0.63)
Variance WTP [17.28] [16.84] [15.88] [12.25] [11.88] [0.45] [0.36]
b 2.29*** 2.26*** 2.27*** 1.93*** 1.90*** 0.37 0.33
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.46) (0.44) (0.44)
γ1 8.96*** 11.56*** 15.88** 6.77** 7.84* 4.20* 4.31
(3.11) (4.30) (6.54) (3.30) (4.51) (2.52) (3.46)
L0 0.86 0.86 1.00 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
log–likelihood −310.85 −311.83 −312.77 −303.92 −305.02 −280.01 −280.86
F 20.47*** 19.17*** 17.94*** 20.05*** 18.96*** 24.26*** 23.62***
¯ R2 0.260 0.247 0.234 0.340 0.327 0.557 0.550
Breusch–Pagan χ2 32.64*** 32.50*** 31.32*** 30.78*** 29.67*** 27.74*** 28.29***
Table note. Endogenous variable: average ticket price (p) in Euros. N = 112. *p ≤ .10,
**p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01. Standard errors in parentheses. Imputed parameters in brackets.
Interactions between variance term and control variables were not determined due to
multicollinearity.
37Table 6 Estimation of the Cost Function Using OLS with White’s Hete-
roscedasticity Correction
All PAOs Non–Competing Competing Opera Theater
Fixed costs 288,465*** 139,300.21 478,108*** 904,364*** 75,624***
(40025) (44791) (77,933) (176,773) (27,708)
Marginal costs 35.25*** 44.75*** 34.26*** 31.72*** 46.22***
(5.18) (8.68) (5.03) (4.52) (7.46)
log–likelihood −2,182.24 −1,325.59 −783.04 −301.80 −857.91
F 715.45*** 96.04*** 274.29*** 104.64 49.89****
¯ R2 0.826 0.492 0.840 0.845 0.437
Breusch–Pagan χ2 357.54*** 46.52*** 48.45*** 5.70** 13.00***
N 152 99 53 20 64
Table notes. Endogenous variable: costs per staging (C) in Euros. *p ≤ .10,
**p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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